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Executive Summary 4

Introduction 5

1. Elements of a US Strategic Missile Defence System 7

2. Why Does America Want to Build Missile Defences? 11

3. What Concerns are Being Raise About Strategic Missile Defences? 17

4. Cooperative Approaches to Addressing Missile Proliferation 21

Conclusion 22

Appendix A: The Implications for Arms Control and Strategic Stability 25

Appendix B: Past, Current and Projected Global Medium, Intermediate

and Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Inventories 28

Appendix C: Facts About the Global Ballistic Missile Environment 33

The six months to April 2001 have seen a plethora of reports on US NMD. Most have been bemused by technical considerations, or unclear as to the implications of US plans. Having hosted informal discussions between the key interested parties (the USA, Russia, China and NATO) for two years, the Oxford Research Group seeks in this report to highlight the security concerns of the Republican Party, to analyse how these fit with the concerns of allies, the concerns and responses of Russia and China and the potential for cooperative approaches to meet these concerns.

On September 1^st 2000 former President Clinton postponed a decision to deploy a National Missile Defence (NMD) system. His successor, George W. Bush, has stated that his administration will go ahead with the development and deployment of extensive national missile defences, though the timetable and scale of any deployment have yet to be decided. The consequences for European and global security of any extensive deployment are potentially grave. It could spark a series of action-reaction cycles between the major powers, and lead to far-reaching political and strategic realignments that could have a serious impact on international security.

Progress with Theatre Missile Defence systems has been increasingly successful in recent years, particularly the US-Israeli Arrow system, the US Army Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (PAC-3) system, the US Army Theatre High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) system and the US Navy Area Wide system. It seems reasonable, therefore, to assume that in the next 10 years the technological step from successfully intercepting short and medium-range ballistic missiles to successfully intercepting intermediate and long-range ballistic missiles will made, allowing some form of limited strategic missile defence to be developed and possibly deployed by the USA. This probability has increased following the election of George W. Bush and the subsequent placing of a National Missile Defence system high on his administration’s agenda.

It is not a missile defence system per se that is a cause of concern, but rather the underlying reasons behind Washington’s desire to build one, how these reasons are perceived in Moscow and Beijing, and their responses. This will shape the extent of a missile defence system, the extent to which cooperation or unilateralism are enlisted in the deployment of a system, and the extent to which international arms controls are adhered to. There seem to be two lines of reasoning at the moment: the first is that a missile defence system should be deployed to protect the continental United States from a limited ballistic missile attack from a so-called ‘rogue state’, and should be done within the context of an arms control framework. In this scenario, one could envisage a truly limited system being deployed with clearly defensive intentions following a renegotiation of the 1972 bi-lateral US-Soviet ABM Treaty (a central arms control treaty that currently forbids the deployment of national missile defences) while keeping Beijing informed of all developments, and in conjunction with other arms control initiatives and cuts in US nuclear weapons. This would minimise the negative impact on strategic relations with Russia and China and disruption to the arms control and non-proliferation regime. Secretary of State Powell seems more inclined to this approach, as do many Democrats in Congress. However, any such agreements would require the Bush administration to place clear limits on the size of any proposed NMD system, risking sharp divisions in the Republican Party and Congress.

The second line of thought is that a missile defence system should be designed and deployed to preserve US supremacy and lay the foundations of a shield that will eventually be based in space with the aim of providing absolute invulnerability and freedom of action. This scenario envisages an extensive missile defence system leading to the weaponisation of space and a unilateral abrogation of the ABM Treaty by the US. This could lead to a series of action-reaction cycles, the further deterioration of relations with Russia and China, maintenance of a large offensive nuclear arsenals, asymmetric and space-based weapons arms racing, and a general undermining of the arms control and non-proliferation regime and cooperative approaches to international security. Secretary of Defence Rumsfeld seems to favour this approach, as do many neo-conservatives in the Republican Party.

Several factors will influence the outcome. The first are the Congressional elections in 2002. If the Democrats gain control of either the House of Representatives or the Senate, or both, Congressional backing for extensive missile defences at the expense of the arms control and non-proliferation regime could fall away. The second factor is the cost; Republican budget hawks in Congress could be unwilling to throw unlimited amounts of money at a national missile defence system at the expense of other policy objectives. Third is the military. Military chiefs are more interested in TMD systems than NMD systems, but over and above missile defences, preference lies in funding more conventional equipment such as tanks, aircraft and ships. A fourth factor is time. The more extensive the NMD system, the longer it will take to build - almost definitely longer than the maximum two terms the Bush administration could serve, thus reducing the chances that it will be deployed. Finally, a fifth factor is the role of Britain and Denmark, both of which could effectively halt the deployment of NMD by refusing to allow the Fylingdales and Thule radar sites to be used for a US strategic missile defence system.

From this a third line of thought could gain momentum and should not be dismissed. This sees national missile defence remaining, to use Pentagon terminology, a technology demonstrator programme, and not actually being deployed at all due to the security, financial and political costs.

The period from now until the Bush administration has formulated a coherent NMD architecture and timeline is a valuable one, especially for the UK and other European governments that undeniably have influence in Washington. This time should be used to try and minimise the negative impact that unilateral deployment of a missile defence will have by stressing the centrality of arms control, cooperation and above all dialogue to international security to Washington. Dialogue is of particular importance in that it can reduce mutual threat perceptions and instil some confidence into a distrustful relationship. Most reports and editorials on NMD in recent months cite a politician from one country, or a military official from another stressing the need for dialogue between all interested parties.

A US ballistic missile defence systems are designed to intercept an incoming hostile ballistic missile, or the warhead released from a hostile missile, with an anti-ballistic missile in a head on collision at enormous speeds or possibly with a high-energy laser fired at the enemy missile. There are two categories of missiles defences: theatre missile defences and strategic missile defences. Theatre missile defences (TMD) are designed to intercept short-range or medium-range ballistic missiles (see Box 1). More sophisticated TMD systems have the capability to intercept intermediate-range ballistic missiles as well. America and Russia are developing several TMD systems. Strategic missile defences are designed to intercept inter-continental ballistic missiles. The proposed National Missile Defence (NMD) system falls in to this category since its is intended to defend the continental United States from small-scale intercontinental ballistic missile attack from so-called ‘rogue states’ such as North Korea, Iran and Iraq or an accidental launch from a nuclear weapon state (NWS).

The Pentagon, at the request of President Bush, began a ‘top-down’ review in February 2001 of all military structures and strategies, including missile defense. This will involve exploration of all the alternatives before formulation of a ‘Bush plan’ and could postpone further decision-making until 2002. Nonetheless, President Bush is likely to formulate an NMD system that employs land and sea-based interceptors, and possibly air-based, and eventually space-based, laser technology. He has also pledged to protect not only all 50 American states, but also regions of Western Europe, Israel, and allies in Asia. Exactly how this would be done has not been elaborated.¹

A land-based component would probably be similar to the limited NMD system envisaged by President Clinton. It would use ground-based early warning radars, X-Band radars and sensors on satellites to detect and track any hostile or accidental missiles launched towards the USA. A ground-based missile would then be fired from the USA towards the incoming hostile missile. Sensors would guide it towards the warhead released by the hostile missile. The hostile warhead would then be destroyed as the anti-ballistic missile slammed into it at enormous speed in the midcourse or terminal-phase (see Box 2). Such a system, initially planned to comprise of around 20 interceptors at one site in the US, could be deployed by 2006-2007 at the earliest. This would only be able to protect the USA but would require early warning radars and X-band radar at Fylingdales in the UK and Thule in Greenland.

A sea-based component of a national missile defence system envisages the expansion of the US Navy Theatre Wide System (NTWS) employed on-board the US Navy’s Aegis ships. This is a theatre missile defence system designed to intercept short and medium-range hostile ballistic missiles in their midcourse or terminal-phase. Its role is to protect US troops and assets deployed abroad, not the continental United States. It has been suggested that the Aegis ships and NTWS interceptor missiles and radars could be modified to give the system the capacity to intercept intercontinental ballistic missiles. The ships could then be stationed several hundred kilometres from a so-called ‘rogue state’ during times of tension, anywhere in the world. This technology could provide protection for US allies. Initial estimates suggest that a sea-based component based on the Aegis ships and the NTWS could be deployed by 2015 at the earliest.²

An airborne laser (ABL) housed aboard a modified Boeing 747 is currently being developed by the US Air Force. The laser is designed to be fired at a hostile missile while in its boost-phase, in order to heat the rocket casing and cause it to fracture and malfunction. Initially designed as a theatre missile defence system, it could also be used to destroy intercontinental ballistic missiles. A test aircraft is currently under construction, and a test against a Scud-type ballistic missile is set for 2003. The plan is for a fleet of 7 ABLs to be operational by 2008. At times of crisis several aircraft could be continuously airborne around a ‘rogue state’.³

The disadvantage of ‘boost-phase’ systems is that they must be deployed near enemy launch sites. The ABL would be susceptible to enemy air-defence systems, similarly, sea-based systems would be vulnerable to attack and expensive to leave on alert indefinitely around a ‘rogue state’.

The Pentagon is planning its first test of a space-based laser (SBL) in 2012. A space-based missile defence system is again designed to fire a laser at the booster rocket of a hostile missile in its boost-phase and destroy it. An array of such lasers could provide global coverage. However, the placing of weapons in space would be extremely controversial. It is estimated that an SBL could be deployed by 2025-2030 at the earliest.⁴ These SBLs will be housed on board a fleet of around 20 space battle stations to allow global coverage.

Plans for a comprehensive NMD system cannot succeed without the use of early-warning radars based outside, as well as inside, the USA. Current plans envisage the use of the early-warning and X-Band radar sites at Fylingdales in Britain and Thule in Greenland, whose foreign policy is administered by Denmark. To quote former US defence secretary William Cohen,

All of these early-warning radars, including Fylingdales, will require upgrading for use in a comprehensive US NMD system. This will involve replacing the computer hardware and software to allow more precise identification and tracking of hostile ballistic missiles. In addition to upgrading the existing radar, an NMD system will also require the construction of a completely new X-Band radar facility. An X-Band radar (so called because it operates in the X-ray band of the electromagnetic spectrum) would provide the US with the crucial discrimination capabilities to distinguish incoming warheads from decoys and debris that the current radars cannot provide.

Two other facilities, one in England and one in Australia, are also central to the functioning of any NMD system. These are the Menwith Hill Ground Relay Station, UK, and the Pine Gap Joint Space Research Facility, Australia. The function of these facilities, with regard to NMD, is to receive information from early-warning and missile-tracking satellites and relay that information to command and control centres in the US. The facility at Menwith Hill allows early-warning information detected by satellites covering the northern hemisphere to be relayed to the USA, similarly the installation at Pine Gap covers the southern hemisphere. Both installations have been used for many years to relay early-warning information to the US and this is unlikely to stop, regardless of whether some of that information is used for a missile defence system.

At present two new radomes have been built at the Menwith Hill facility in order to receive information from a new US satellite network called the Space-Based Infra Red System (SBIRS). This system is designed not only to replace the current early warning satellite system (the Defence Position System – DPS), but also to play a central role in a national missile defence system. The current satellite system is used to detect and track hostile ballistic missiles, whereas the SBIRS system will also be able guide anti-ballistic missile interceptors towards these hostile missiles. It must be assumed that all of these facilities will become targets of any country wanting to disable a US national missile defence system.

So far the Bush administration has not made a formal request to either the British or Danish governments to develop the Fylingdales and Thule radar facilities respectively. Neither government seems particularly keen to condone US NMD plans by giving Washington permission to use these bases as part of an NMD system, but both recognise the diplomatic costs of refusal. While London and Copenhagen play the ‘wait and see’ game, pressure groups in the UK, Denmark and Greenland continue to oppose the use of Fylingdales and Thule for an NMD system.

The 1972 US-Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty is a central factor in the decision-making process. Current US missile defence plans will break the terms of this treaty but both London and Copenhagen (and most other countries) wish to see it preserved through an agreed renegotiation between Washington and Moscow. The treaty currently forbids, amongst other things, the modification of non-ABM radars (the Fylingdales radar is a ‘non-ABM’ radar) to work as part of an ABM system (Article VI ). It also prohibits the deployment of ABM system components in other nations (Article IX). Even though the treaty is a bi-lateral affair between the US and Russia, if Britain and Denmark allow the use of their respective facilities without an agreement having been reached between Washington and Moscow, they will necessarily be aiding and abetting the abrogation of a central arms control treaty (see Appendix A)⁶

Both London and Copenhagen are also likely to face local problems should permission be granted to the US. Though Greenland’s foreign and defence policy is controlled by Denmark, Greenland’s Prime Minister stated in an interview,

As outlined above, Washington is likely to request permission to construct a new X-band radar at the Fylingdales site. This would entail a huge construction that the Fylingdales site may not be able to accommodate. If this proves to be the case, construction would have to spill out in to the North Yorkshire Moors national park. This would require planning permission, and a public enquiry to determine such permission could take five years or more.

Having looked at the main strategic missile defence options available to the Bush administration, we must now ask why the US wants to build and deploy these defences.

Political popularity for missile defences is longstanding. The first missile defence system was deployed in 1967 but was immediately taken off line because it didn’t work. The US-Soviet 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty banned national missile defences in an effort to establish and maintain strategic stability. Nonetheless research and development continued throughout the Cold War. In the 1980s President Reagan announced the Strategic Defence Initiative, or ‘Star Wars’, plan that aimed to place anti-ballistic missiles and lasers in space to destroy thousands of incoming Soviet warheads. Financial and technological barriers led to the demise of the programme. In 1991 President Bush unveiled the GPALS system, Global Protection Against Limited Strikes, essentially a scaled down version of SDI that involved placing weapons in space to intercept a limited number of warheads. The latest incarnation, President Clinton’s National Missile Defence, is a further dilution of GPALS, involving a land-based system to protect only the USA from a very limited number of warheads.

The strategic missile defence debate has taken on a renewed vigour in post-Cold War America for four reasons. Firstly, the nature of the threat has changed making national missile defences a perceived necessity. Secondly, there has been a shift in US foreign policy towards unilateralism and isolationism: NMD is a symptom of this shift. Thirdly, the requirements of current NMD plans are more in step with the systems that cutting-edge technology can realistically deliver than in any previous incarnation. US officials now believe that the technology has progressed far enough to allow a limited system to be built and deployed, although some technical hurdles still have to be overcome. Underlying these first three reasons is the fourth driving force behind NMD: the Republican Party. With a ‘realist’ attitude towards foreign policy and defence, the Republican Party has traditionally been a strong advocate of missile defences and has used its majority in Congress for the past six years to push the issue forward and make deployment of a national missile defence system a constitutional requirement.

The past decade has seen a steady increase in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction technology and ballistic missile technology. Washington increasingly views these developments as a major threat to its security (see Box 3). The countries of particular concern, the so-called ‘rogue states’, are North Korea, Iran, Iraq and to a lesser extent Libya and Syria. North Korea, Iran and Iraq have programmes aimed at developing or acquiring ICBMs. North Korea is ahead of the field in this regard, and is an active proliferator of the technology as one of its few means of receiving hard currency. However, in the context of Cold War ballistic missile arsenals, the emerging WMD threat from ‘rogue states’ is small, though a threat nonetheless. For a more detailed analysis of past, current and projected global medium-range, intermediate-range and intercontinental ballistic missile inventories see

Appendix B.

US foreign policy appears to have undergone a shift to the right since the mid-1990s. This shift stems in part from a growing loss of confidence in cooperative security structures and arms control as a means of dealing with international crises and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Washington has encountered many problems in dealing with international crises in the 1990s. These problems stem from the differences between American, Russian and Chinese policies towards Bosnia, Iraq and Kosovo and consequently have made multilateral cooperation on other issues very difficult, in particular arms control and non-proliferation. The difficulties Washington has experienced in this field include: a lack of movement on the START II treaty; growing Russian commitments to nuclear deterrence, particularly its reliance on tactical nuclear weapons (due to the deterioration of its conventional forces); the declaration of India and Pakistan as nuclear weapon states; the problems encountered with UNSCOM and dismantling the Iraqi WMD programme; and the difficulties implementing the 1994 Agreed Framework with North Korea, compounded by the testing of its Taep’o-Dong 1 intermediate-range ballistic missile in 1998. Underlying these events has been the continuing proliferation of WMD technology by China, Russia and latterly North Korea (see Box 4).

As Professor William Walker of Aberdeen University argues, this loss of confidence in cooperative security structures and the arms control and non-proliferation regime and readjustment of threat perception has led to a radical critique of the post-Cold War strategic environment, particularly within the Republican Party which has dominated the Senate for the past six years. This critique is based on the assumption that there are irreconcilable differences between countries and civilisations that cannot be overcome. It views diplomacy, cooperative security regimes and arms control as incapable of providing security as they can no longer be trusted to prevent proliferation, deal with international crises or tackle abrogation of non-proliferation commitments by other countries. Hence the USA will increasingly rely on its own economic, political and especially military power to protect itself and its interests, rather than relying on multilateral security structures; it is longer willing to be constrained by Cold War arms control and technological restraints such as the ABM Treaty; and it no longer believes that the Cold War strategy of nuclear deterrence can be relied upon to protect America from the emerging group of threatening and irrational ‘rogue states’, in the way that the USSR was deterred. This constitutes a major challenge to the post-Cold War status quo.¹⁰

The result of this critique has been a shift in foreign policy from the interdependence characterised by the Clinton administration (cooperation to meet foreign policy objectives) to a combination of unilateralism (achieving foreign policy objectives independently because cooperation is deemed ineffective) and isolationism (withdrawal from international commitments and international treaties and only engaging in such activities that serve US national interests) as the best means of assuring US security. Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld confirmed this shift when he stated that treaties,

The President’s National Security Adviser, Condoleeza Rice, further reinforced this perspective by stating that the administration’s foreign policy will,

In contrast, the strategic culture of European countries is quite different. For the past 300 years or more, most European nation-states have been vulnerable to and have directly experienced external aggression. Thus a security paradigm of vulnerability has become the norm. For the duration of the Cold War vulnerability to the Soviet nuclear arsenal and the armies of the Warsaw Pact was inescapable. In comparison, the current limited ballistic missile capabilities of ‘rogue states’ are not deemed such an immediate and pressing threat, although it is recognised that the problem will have to be addressed.¹⁴

The desire on the part of the US to deploy a national missile defence system is a symptom of these shifts. It is both a means of denying ‘rogue states’ the opportunity to deter the USA with a threat of WMD, a threat realised through the failure of the non-proliferation regime, as well as a means of protecting the American homeland from a surprise ballistic missile attack. In essence it is both a shield behind which the US can safely withdraw, and a shield that will allow the US to preserve a freedom of action to independently meet its foreign policy objectives (including counter-proliferation objectives) without fear of reprisal.

There are many groups, organisations and events that have shaped the development of the NMD debate within the USA, a debate that has been far from rational, and heavily politicised from the outset. One of the key actors involved has been the Republican Party and its influence in Congress. Sustained and powerful Congressional pressure for deployment of a national missile defence system began in 1994 when the Republicans took control of both Houses of Congress, with a majority in both the House of Representatives and the Senate, on an election platform called "Contract with America" that called for, amongst other things, an effective national missile defence system. The financial authority and legislative strength of Congress led to a significant increase in money allocated to NMD development and a succession of bills to make NMD deployment a legal requirement, the Missile Defense Act finally being signed by President Clinton in July 1999.

Republican Party ideology seems to be the real force behind this Congressional pressure. Both the Senate Republican Policy Committee and the House Republican Policy Committee have pushed for extensive ballistic missile defences while the strength and coherence of the Republican majority within the Senate has been particularly effective. Judging by the absence of public discussion and pressure for deployment these Congressional pressures for an NMD system are far more ideological than political. Indeed, deployment is regarded by the Republican right as a matter of principle, regardless of technical difficulties or international repercussions, as President Bush’s 2000 election platform stated:

The domestic pressure from the Republican right would probably have remained ideological without the external impulses generated by the proliferation of longer range ballistic missiles. The export and development of this technology by countries such as North Korea, China, Russia, Iran, Pakistan and Libya has provided a politically compelling case for missile defence. Two external events were particularly important in this regard. The first was the intimidating launch of several Chinese M-9 intermediate-range ballistic missiles over the Taiwan Straits, extremely close to the island, during the run-up to the 1996 Taiwan elections. The Bush administration, in line with traditional Republican thinking, has been more hostile towards China than the Clinton administration, regarding Beijing as a competitor rather than a ‘strategic partner’. Secondly, in 1998 North Korea fired its Taep’o Dong-1 IRBM over Japan in an attempt to launch a satellite, with the debris landing in the Pacific Ocean not far from Alaska. Although the test failed, it came just six weeks after the Senate-sponsored Rumsfeld Commission concluded that the US faced an imminent ICBM threat. Many analysts argue that this report hyped the ballistic missile threat giving a huge boost to the pro-NMD lobby, a boost compounded by the North Korean test.

Pressure for NMD from the right wing of the Republican Party has been supplemented by pro-NMD elements within the Pentagon and the military-industrial complex that wield significant influence on the shape and direction of the debate. This combination is crucial, since history has shown that once big military programmes have Congress and contractors on board they are rarely cancelled.

The future of arms control, the size of the US nuclear weapons arsenal and the shape of a national missile defence system, all of which are intrinsically linked, have yet to be enshrined in policy by the Bush administration. However a number of statements and reports provide a good idea of what the world can expect.

A recent report by the National Institute for Public Policy entitled "Rationale and Requirements for US Nuclear Forces and Arms Control" details an outline for the Bush administration’s policy towards arms control and disarmament based on unilateralism and the discarding of international treaties. It is of particular relevance because of the 27 participants involved in the consultation of which the report is the outcome, 3 are now serving in the Bush administration. These are Deputy National Security Advisor, Stephen Hadley, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Stephen Cambone, and Ambassador Robert Joseph who is responsible for counter-proliferation and national missile defense at the National Security Council. The report concludes that America must preserve its capability to adapt its strategic and defensive forces to changing international strategic conditions. As a result, arms control treaties such as a START III, the CTBT and the ABM Treaty, that legally prevent the US from changing the size and structure of its of offensive and defensive strategic forces, are seen as undesirable.

President Bush, Vice President Cheney, National Security Adviser Rice, Secretary of Defence Rumsfeld and Secretary of State Powell have all committed the administration to the development and deployment of extensive missile defences. Secretary of State Colin Powell said during his US Senate confirmation hearing that,

President Bush stated in his presidential campaign that he would cut nuclear weapons to,

He ordered a Nuclear Posture Review upon entering office, which many hope will recommend US nuclear weapons be reduced to below START II levels. However Defence Secretary Rumsfeld has been less forthcoming about the potential for big cuts stating that,

A more detailed policy picture is expected to emerge following two important reviews due to be completed towards the end of 2001, namely the 2001 Quadrennial Defence Review (QDR) and the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). The 1996 Defence Authorisation Bill (a bill which is passed each federal year by Congress to allocate money for defence spending) stated that a quadrennial review of the US defence programme be conducted at the beginning of each newly elected Presidential administration. The first of these was completed in 1997 and had much to say about NMD. The 2001 Defense Authorisation Bill called for a comprehensive Nuclear Posture Review that will determine the role of US nuclear forces for the next 5-10 years. The results of both reviews are to be submitted to Congress in December 2001. How the House and Senate will respond to these reports in terms of recommendations, legislation and requests for further clarification and exploration of certain issues is not known, but a clearer relationship between missile defence, nuclear deterrence and arms control is certain to materialise. It has already been suggested that, under pressure from Secretary of State Colin Powell, an independent commission will be established to define how an NMD system will be introduced.¹⁸ It is also unclear how future policy will relate to stated NATO policy (see Box 5).

This shift in US foreign policy and the prospect of NMD deployment is challenging the status quo of nuclear deterrence, mutual vulnerability and non-proliferation strategies. This is causing particular friction with Moscow whose ‘great power’ status is linked to Cold War strategic nuclear weapons parity with the US and the Cold War doctrines of deterrence and mutual vulnerability that still inform strategic defence policy. It is causing tension with China since Beijing considers itself to have had a small but credible deterrent force vis-à-vis the USA for 20 years and is unwilling to see that relationship change. European countries have expressed concern at the potential for a re-militarisation of international relations should tensions around NMD between America, Russia and China not be resolved. Having survived 40 years of US-Russian enmity during the Cold War, European governments do not want to see those hostilities return. Finally there is widespread concern that NMD deployment could pave the way towards a gradual weaponisation of space.

The first concern is that there are elements within the US administration, Congress and Pentagon that want the shift towards unilateralism to lead to invulnerability through military supremacy. The US Space Command’s Vision 2020 document outlines this objective of ‘full spectrum dominance of land, sea, air and space’. Advocates of this approach see the international environment consisting of a unipolar system with America at the pole. US actions are generally seen as benign but necessary in Washington, but other major powers do not share this view. Rather they see the world as a multi-polar system with centres of military, economic or political power in Russia, Europe, India, China and Japan as well as America. Further US efforts to establish greater superiority will be seen as a threat to other major powers’ regional interests and cause hostile reactions. Such reactions are likely to threaten the arms control and non-proliferation regime, lead to international crises, potentially further proliferation and spark a series of arms races. Chinese and Russian criticisms of NMD are primarily focussed on this first concern of a US quest for invulnerability which. The fear is that supremacy/invulnerability is the ultimate goal of America foreign policy, that American intentions are not benign, and that NMD is an integral part of this strategy. In July 2000 the Presidents of Russia and China issued a joint statement to this effect, claiming that national missile defence is "an attempt to seek unilateral military and security advantages". This can be dismissed as self-serving rhetoric, but conversations with representatives of the two countries at an Oxford Research Group consultation in August 2000 indicate a serious concern. Suspicion is also centred on the credibility of US assurances that NMD will never be developed to counter China and Russia. Their suspicion is legitimate since it is unlikely that the US will keep to a limited NMD system to deal with the so-called ‘rogue states’ having invested so much into developing the technology over the past four decades. It is more realistic to assume that a limited system will eventually be expanded to cover much larger threats. Indeed in 1999 Senator Jon Kyl (R-Ariz) stated that "National Missile Defense must be able to defeat and deter the Chinese threat".¹⁹

In particular, Moscow’s fear rests on Washington’s abandonment of deterrence and the development of a potential US first-strike capability using offensive strategic nuclear forces and defensive strategic missile defences. Following NATO’s eastward expansion, its war on Yugoslavia, and the progressive degradation of Russia’s early-warning infrastructure, the fear is that a US/NATO first strike could so decimate Russia’s already depleted nuclear arsenal, as to render Moscow’s surviving retaliatory capacity impotent in the face of a US NMD system. Although such a first strike may not be Washington’s intention, the fact that it may develop the capability to do so is likely to lead to friction between Russia and the US. Regardless of Russian first-strike threat perceptions, a shift away from deterrence and towards missile defences will have serious implications for strategic stability if it is done unilaterally.

Beijing’s fear centres on a) the potential for US military engagement over Taiwan, confident that it can neutralise China’s small strategic nuclear deterrent with its strategic missile defences, and b) the provision of theatre missile defences (TMD) to Taiwan to neutralise Beijing’s medium and intermediate-range ballistic missiles. Beijing is concerned that if the US supplies TMD systems to Japan / Taiwan / South Korea (see Box 6) it will enable the US to greatly enhance its capability for military involvement in regional security issues. China therefore views any deployment of US TMD systems as not only a major destabilisation of the regional security environment, but also as an extension of the proposed NMD system to protect the continental USA, and will react accordingly.

In particular, the fear is that such deployments could leave Beijing with few options should Taipei declare independence from China. Hence the incorporation of Taiwan under a US TMD shield will be interpreted as direct interference in China’s internal affairs and constitute a major shift in Sino-US relations.²⁰

The second concern is directly related to the first. It is that American unilateralism-isolationism could herald a return to a competitive, ‘realist’, militarised state of international relations between the major powers (primarily America, Russia and China), sparked by unresolved tensions over national missile defence. This could lead to negative action-reaction responses as coercion and military power replace the cooperative norms developed in the post-Cold War period. In the long-term, this could lead to the steady collapse of the arms control and non-proliferation regimes (which are based on cooperation), further proliferation of WMD, and further rounds of arms races between the major powers that could lead to the weaponisation of space. Concerns voiced by European governments fall mainly into this area since arms control and cooperative relations with Russia are a high security priority. In particular arms control agreements are seen to increase security by institutionalising predictability, transparency, confidence and cooperation. This concern of a re-militarisation of international relations is based on observation of the more competitive view of international relations already emerging from the Bush administration where China is no longer seen as a strategic partner but as a strategic competitor, the European Union Rapid Reaction Force is seen as a threat to NATO, and, in the opinion of National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice,

NMD deployment is accepted by the highest levels of US military command as the next step towards the complete domination of space. A recent symposium entitled ‘Space and Missile Defense – Key Enablers of Strategic Dominance’ was co-sponsored by the US Army War College, the US Army Space and Missile Command and the Association of the US Army. The conference brief states that "strategic dominance in space is exactly what the United States should be contemplating and achieving" in what was labelled "the great geostrategic game".²³

This alarming doctrine of ‘full spectrum dominance of land, sea, air and space’ is clearly spelt out in the US Space Command’s ‘Vision 2020’ document. It makes the prospect of the weaponisation of outer space and the extension of arms racing into this new arena a likely scenario following the deployment of NMD. In particular this is could lead to the deployment of high-energy laser weapons on space battle stations to attack hostile ballistic missiles (and potentially any ground target) soon after they have been launched. An array of advanced technologies identified by the 1999 Defense Science Board are being researched and developed to fulfil the perceived need for space domination. They include particle-beam generators, electro-magnetic guns, free-electron lasers, X-ray lasers and chemical lasers. Current plans envisage an Integrated Flight Experiment for the Space-Based Laser (SBL - a high-energy chemical laser) programme in 2012. However, space-based weapon platforms are unacceptable for many people, for aesthetic, spiritual and other reasons. There is, for example, a fear that space-based laser weapons might ignite substances and buildings on the Earth's surface. Such weapons raise the concept of 'death rays', fear of which is embedded deep in the psyche of many. Moreover, the idea that the Earth's surface can be dominated by a single power causes considerable concern.

At present thirty or more nations possess significant space industries and eight countries have direct access to space through Space Launch Vehicles (SLVs). If the USA decides to place weapons in space it will have a significant technological and strategic advantage, but the advantage will not remain for long. Other major or regional powers will develop their own space-based systems or asymmetric technology (such as information warfare, anti-satellite weapons and other systems designed to disable enemy weapon-systems rather than compete with those systems) that could target US space-based weapons and the early-warning satellites that provide essential battle information. For example, in the event of hostilities Russia could consider extreme responses to NMD by disabling US space-based sensors by nuclear explosions. China recently announced that it has developed and successfully ground-tested a new anti-satellite weapon designed to ‘stick’ to the body of an enemy satellite so as to go unnoticed, then rendering it ineffective through jamming when activated. The anti-satellite weapon called a ‘parasitic satellite’, will be deployed experimentally and tested in space in the near future according to Hong Kong newspaper Sing Tai Jih Pao.²⁴

This extension of war-fighting to space has many serious implications. Since the US alone has over 200 commercial, civil and military satellites in active operation with a combined value of over $100 billion, the primary cause for concern would be the economic and conflict-management consequences of the global breakdown of communication systems, both military and commercial. For these reasons, it is often argued it would be in the long-term interests of the major powers to negotiate a treaty to prohibit the weaponisation of space. This could include an agreement on the peaceful uses of space, a treaty to ban the deployment of ground or space-based anti-satellite weapons, and the expansion of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty (which currently prohibits the placing of nuclear weapons in space) to cover directed energy and laser weapons.

This looks unlikely under the current administration. Of particular importance is the recent Commission to Assess National Security Space Management and Organisation, a Congressionally mandated panel headed by Senator Donald Rumsfeld immediately prior to his appointment as Secretary of Defence. The Commission has called for the establishment of an Under-Secretary of Defence for Space, Intelligence and Communication, the development of space weapons and the option to deploy them.²⁵

Several arms control initiatives have been outlined to address and control the threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. These focus on a radical restructuring of the current Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR – see Box 7)

The MTCR was originally established as means of slowing down the proliferation of ballistic missile technology through export controls by those states with access to ballistic missile technology. However, this technology is now available in many countries outside the regime. If this proliferation is to be prevented, a more comprehensive global regime is needed. Ideally this would envisage initiatives to:

• Restrict the development of all missiles and missile defenses.
• Ban the flight-testing of all missiles together with intrusive verification measures.
• Develop of missile–free zones.
• Establish an international transparency regime on missile programmes with an international data exchange centre.
• Establish a pre-launch notification agreement.
• Develop confidence-building measures (CBMs) and verification measures to distinguish between legitimate space-vehicle programmes and potentially destabilising ballistic missile programmes.

Some of these ideas are currently being developed in a variety of fora:

• In December 2000 former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov signed an agreement to establish the Joint Data Exchange Centre (JDEC). This greatly expands advance notice of ballistic missile launches in an effort to reduce the risk of an accidental nuclear launch. The US and Russia currently notify each other of launches of intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine launched missiles, but under the new agreement advance launch notification will be expanded to include space launches and launches of missiles with ranges as short as 500 kilometres. Eventually other countries will be encouraged to participate. The centre will foster greater predictability and preclude ‘worst-case’ scenario planning by providing reliable information.²⁷

• Over the past few years the MTCR has been moving towards a more comprehensive approach to missile control. This culminated in a draft Code of Conduct for responsible missile behaviour in October 2000 following a series of meetings with non-member states. Essentially the Code aims to promote multilateral transparency and encourage pre-launch notification.

• Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov put forward proposals for a Global Control System of Missile and Missile Technology (GCS) at the NPT Review Conference in 2000. Initiatives under the GCS include a pre-launch notification agreement and incentives to persuade members of the regime to give up existing ballistic missile arsenals or not develop them at all. Such incentives include access to satellite launch facilities and UN Security Council security guarantees in the event of a WMD attack. The feasibility of the latter has been questioned.²⁸

Bilateral approaches can also be successful. US engagement with North Korea has certainly slowed down its ballistic missile programme, and in the last months of 2000 further progress was made with China. Under pressure from the US, Beijing has stated that,

In return Washington will waive sanctions required by US law for past assistance by Chinese entities to Iranian and Pakistani missile programs.

The centrality of export controls in preventing proliferation is widely recognised, though a more internationally coordinated export control regime is needed to address the proliferation of dual-use technologies (those that can be used or both civilian and military purposes and in the development of WMD). The German Intelligence Agency states that,

The long-term success of a global missile control regime will depend not only on whether it is comprehensive and multilateral, but also whether it is non-discriminatory and brings all ballistic missile arsenals into consideration. Otherwise any such regime will face the same problems as the NPT with the US and Russia, which deploy thousands of long-range and intermediate-range missiles, asking other states not to deploy even a few such missiles Nonetheless, these developments demonstrate that the political will exists to develop some form of multilateral regime to comprehensively address ballistic missile proliferation.

The proliferation of the ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction has generally been a symptom of regional problems, in particular in the Middle East, South Asia and the Korean Peninsula. Some of these WMD and ballistic missile programmes have been fuelled by a desire to prevent the US from intervening in the region by deterring it, rather than directly threatening it. All of these areas are embroiled in deep-seated long-standing conflicts, namely Arab-Israeli hostilities, Indo-Pakistan hostilities and North-South Korea hostilities. In the long-term, the success of non-proliferation strategies, whether they focus on nuclear weapons or ballistic missiles, will depend on the willingness of the major powers to diplomatically and economically engage the regional concerns of those states that are a cause of proliferation concern, and also engage each other in cooperative efforts to reduce the number and status of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction, in particular nuclear weapons, inline with NPT commitments. Successful engagement on both fronts requires a reduction of mutual threat perception through a replacement of fear and suspicion with trust and confidence. It will also require a shift away from the traditional ‘realist’ view, since if one assumes there will be threats in the future and actively looks for them, they will probably be found whether realistic or not.

These shifts will require not only traditional arms control and confidence-building measures, but also competence in the fields of conflict prevention, mediation and resolution in which there is a fast-growing bank of expertise. They will also depend on how high on the policy agenda comprehensive non-proliferation is, how necessary it is perceived to be for overall security, the extent to which other countries would be prepared to work towards this common goal and how effectively those who step outside the non-proliferation regime could be dealt with by the international community.

A US administration that is not prepared to engage other nations in such a manner and disregards the role of arms control has little chance of meeting the non-proliferation objectives designed to enhance its security. At present, many so-called ‘rogue states’, as well as Russia and China, see the US as the main threat to their security and regard WMD as the best means of deterring the world’s peerless military superpower. If strategic missile defences are deployed unilaterally they are likely to cause further proliferation of WMD and ballistic missiles and greater alienation of these countries by reinforcing already ingrained threat perceptions. Security issues can only be successfully addressed in the context of inclusive cooperation, negotiation and dialogue, rather than a unilateral quest for absolute security at the expense of others. In the case of NMD, attempting to solve one security problem through a unilateral/militarist policy is likely to aggravate other security problems, particularly with China and Russia. This is unlikely to serve the longer-term security interests of America and its allies.

A more immediate military response by China and Russia would be to increase their missile alert rates and build more missiles if America goes ahead with NMD deployment.

Russia is likely to respond by increasing the already dangerously high-alert rates and launch-on-warning posture of its SLBM and ICBM forces as well as the alert-rates of its deteriorating early-warning radars and nuclear command posts. This will lead to a much greater risk of accidental, unauthorised or inadvertent launch, a risk that is viewed by many as dangerously high. China could increase its alert rates by permanently mating its warhead and missiles (current policy keeps them separated) and heightening its launch on warning posture.

Beijing has had a small but credible nuclear retaliatory force vis-à-vis the United States for nearly two decades, and is unlikely to allow this to be compromised by American missile defences. Although China is already engaged in a nuclear modernisation programme the size and sophistication of its ICBM arsenal is likely to reflect the perceived need to defeat any US national missile defences.⁷ The 2000 US National Intelligence Estimate⁸, leaked to the press in August 2000, acknowledged that developing an NMD system could easily lead to an arms race in Asia. It warned that China would rapidly expand its relatively small arsenal of roughly 20 long-range nuclear missiles to a quantity large enough to overwhelm a limited NMD system. China could deploy up to 200 ICBMs by 2015, prompting India and Pakistan to respond with their own build-up⁹.

A renewed US-Russian arms race could also emerge. Although Russia cannot afford to maintain its current ICBM and SLBM arsenal, the head of the Strategic Rocket Forces, Marshal Sergeyev, recently indicated that Russia was making contingency plans to respond to any NMD deployment by developing asymmetrical methods and technology to penetrate any missile shield, rather than build a missile shield of its own, "’a lot of money was invested in these programs’, before they were abandoned at the end of the Cold War, ‘but we still have them and can take them up again’".¹⁰

It is probably impossible to perfect the technology necessary to stop the current generation of ballistic missiles in the foreseeable future. Should NMD deployment spark arms races with Russia and/or China an expected response would be the adoption of more sophisticated counter-measures, larger numbers of multiple warheads on missiles, the development and deployment of anti-satellite weaponry, other ‘asymmetric’ technologies and the proliferation of counter-measures to ‘rogue states’ to thwart the missile defences. Washington’s response to this would probably be to build more sophisticated missile defences, maintain a large nuclear arsenal and move away from the arms control and non-proliferation regime along with Russia and China, potentially leading to the weaponisation of space.