The Bush administration is going full steam ahead with missile defence. I’ll describe the current missile defence situation; how it is portrayed by the Bush administration; the philosophical arguments against missile defence; some practical arguments against it; and some alternatives.

A multi-layered missile defence system has been a dream of many conservative international security thinkers in the USA for several decades. In fact the US deployed a missile defence system in 1967 to protect a nuclear missile base, but it was immediately taken ‘off-line’ because it didn’t work.

Then in 1972 the USA and USSR signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. This banned the deployment of missile defences in an effort to establish some stability in the escalating nuclear arms race. Nonetheless research and development continued throughout the Cold War:

• In the 1980s President Reagan announced the Strategic Defence Initiative, or ‘Star Wars’, plan that aimed to place anti-ballistic missiles and lasers in space to destroy thousands of incoming Soviet warheads. Financial and technological barriers led to the demise of the programme;
• In 1991 President Bush unveiled the GPALS system, Global Protection Against Limited Strikes, essentially a scaled down version of SDI that involved placing weapons in space to intercept a limited number of warheads;
• In 1993 President Clinton restructured the Strategic Defense Initiative Organisation and renamed it the Ballistic Missile Defence Organisation. His National Missile Defence system was a further dilution of GPALS involving a land-based system to protect only the USA from a very limited number of incoming warheads.
• In 2001 Bush II again restructured things and transformed the Ballistic Missile Defense Organisation into the Missile Defense Agency. His team placed enormous emphasis on developing and deploying several types of missile defence systems, accusing the Clinton administration of not doing nearly enough. To allow them to do this the USA withdrew from the ABM Treaty in 2002.

A ballistic missile uses a large rocket to fire itself above the atmosphere and towards its intended target. It then follows a ballistic trajectory and falls back through the atmosphere to strike home. More sophisticated intercontinental ballistic missiles will release one or more warheads once the missile has been carried above the atmosphere. The burnt out rocket section of the missile is discarded and burns away as it falls back to earth. Ballistic missiles are categorised as intercontinental, intermediate- or long-range, medium-range or short-range depending on how far they can travel.

Ballistic missiles can be targeted by interceptors at various parts of its flight path. Generally there are three phases: when a missile has just been fired, when its flying along up in space, and when its on its back down towards its target – or to use the jargon: boost-phase, midcourse-phase and terminal-phase.

The USA is developing multiple systems for each of these three phases and plans to integrate them altogether into one overall ‘system of systems’. So it’s important to understand that this is not just one system, one new weapon like a new submarine or a new jet fighter, it’s a vast, integrated, cutting edge network of weapon systems that are being developed simultaneously, some in partnership with other countries.

The US intends to fully deploy the following missile defense systems by 2015, although space-based components may take another 10-20 to be deployed. But missile defense efforts are unlikely to stop there. As such the second important point is that the US missile defence programme is open-ended, it has no set end point. The development and deployment of these systems is evolutionary: as each system is tested it will be deployed, integrated into the network and improved. As new technologies are researched and new ideas come to fruition they to will be developed and deployed. The end point has not been defined, although there are clear indications that it will the weaponisation and control of space using exotic laser technology.

• Ground-based Midcourse Defense: known as National Missile Defense under Clinton, the ‘GMD’ system involves firing interceptor missiles from the ground to destroy, through a head-on collision, an enemy warhead whilst it is travelling through space. The GMD system is designed to destroy long-range and intercontinental missiles. The plan is to deploy 6 interceptors at a site in Alaska and 4 at a site in California in 2004, adding another 10 at the Alaska site in 2005. The total number of ground-based interceptors is currently planned at either a single site with 100 interceptors or 2 sites with 250 interceptors. The total cost from 1996 (when work began on this system) to 2015 of the latter option is estimated at a minimum of $76.2 billion. The cost of a 20-year life-span has been estimated at a minimum of $43.8 billion.

• Sea-based Midcourse Defence: (this was the ‘Navy Theatre Wide System’) the US is planning to put interceptors on board some of its 60 Aegis destroyer and cruiser ships. These interceptors are designed to destroy medium- and short-range ballistic missiles. The sea-based component of the US missile defence programme is known as the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense system or Aegis BMD. Japan began working closely with the US on this system in 1999. The plan is to deploy 20 interceptors by 2005. This system would compliment the GMD system. It is estimated that full deployment will require around 12 Aegis ships deploying around 100 interceptor missiles. The total cost from 1996 (when work began on this system) to 2015 of this plan is estimated at a minimum of $37.1 billion. The cost of a 20-year life-span has been estimated at a minimum of $33.4 billion.

The US BMD programme has four systems designed to hit missiles in the ‘terminal-phase’.

• Theatre High Altitude Area Defense System (THAAD): This system is designed to hit medium- and short-range ballistic missiles. It is designed to protect armed forces in the field, US assets that are spread over a wide area and population centres such as a big town. This system will cost around $21.9 billion to deploy and about $8 billion to operate through to 2035.

• Arrow Weapon System: the Arrow system is again designed to hit medium- and short-range ballistic missiles and has been developed jointly by the USA and Israel. Israel deployed this system in 2000 and both countries continue to work on its improvement. Cooperation of Arrow began in 1986, and was spurred on by the 1990 Gulf War. The system has cost around $1.3 billion.

• Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (PAC-3) system: Again designed to hit medium- and short-range ballistic missiles, as well as low-flying aircraft and possibly cruise missiles. The PAC-3 system began development in 1994. The plan is to build about 1,150 interceptors and the project will cost around $13.8 billion to develop and deploy and about $4.8 billion to operate until 2035. The system will be deployed this year. PAC-2 was deployed and used during the recent war in Iraq.

• Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS): this system is deigned to protect forces in the field from short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. It is being developed jointly by the US, Germany and Italy. The system will use PAC-3 technology. Deployment will be around 2010. The total cost of developing and deploying the system is around $23 billion. Germany will cover 25 % and Italy 15% of the costs with the US paying the rest.

The US BMD programme has three systems designed to hit missiles in the ‘terminal-phase’.

• Airborne Laser (ABL): housed aboard a modified Boeing 747, the laser is designed to be fired at a hostile missile while in its boost-phase, in order to heat the rocket casing and cause it to fracture and malfunction. It could be used to destroy all types of ballistic missiles designed to destroy. The programme began in 1994 and a test aircraft is currently under construction, and a test against a Scud-type ballistic missile is set for 2005. The plan is to deploy 7 Boeings, each with an ABL by 2010. The total cost of deployment and operation up to 2035 is $19.3 billion.

• Space-based Laser (SBL): the SBL missile defence system is again designed to fire a laser at the booster rocket of a hostile missile in its boost-phase and destroy it. An array of such lasers could provide global coverage. However, the placing of weapons in space would be extremely controversial. It is thought that work on the SBL programme begin in 1995 and it is estimated that an SBL could be deployed by 2025-2030 at the earliest. These SBLs will be housed on board a fleet of around 48 space battle stations to allow global coverage. The cost of developing and deploying the system by 2025 is estimated at $134.5 billion. The costs of operating the system for 20 years are estimated at $166.9 billion.

• Space-based interceptor: still in its early stages of development, the US is researching a space-based missile defence system that will fire an interceptor missile, rather than a laser, at an enemy ballistic missile in its ‘boost-phase’. These systems would be much smaller than those that might house an SBL and the interceptors themselves would be much smaller than ground-based interceptors because they would not have to overcome gravity. This system is base on the ‘GPALS’ system of Bush I. A rough estimate of the costs of such a system, with approximately 1,000 mini-interceptors in space operating for 20 years, is $76 billion.

The US is building a vast network of satellites, radars and command, control and battle management systems to detect, track and intercept enemy missiles.

Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS): this new series of satellites to detect and track enemy ballistic missiles is currently being researched and designed. As the technology for tracking ballistic missiles and warheads matures and guiding interceptor missiles towards their targets matures, new satellites will be developed and launched. World-wide coverage envisages 25-30 such satellites. The costs for this system are included in the costs for the GMD system.

Russian-American Observation Satellites (RAMOS): The US and Russia have also embarked on a joint project, the RAMOS programme, to improve early warning technologies. If the project goes ahead as planned two satellites will be launched in 2008.

Space-Based Infra Red System-High: The US is also in the process of replacing its current early warning satellite system (the Defence Position System – DPS) with a new satellite network called SBIRS-High (for high orbit). This system is designed not only to replace the DPS network but also to play a central role in the ballistic missile defence programme. The current satellite system is used to detect and track hostile ballistic missiles, whereas the SBIRS system will also be able guide anti-ballistic missile interceptors towards these hostile missiles. It will probably start to be deployed in 2006.

Satellites in space and Early Warning Radars on the ground make up the ‘eyes and ears’ of the BMD programme.

Existing Early Warning Radars: During the Cold War the US built many Early Warning Radars in the US and abroad to detect the launch of Soviet ballistic missiles.

The current US ground-based early warning radar system to detect the firing of potentially hostile ballistic missiles consists of the BMEWS network (Ballistic Missile Early Warning System) and the PAVE PAWS network. The BMEWS network comprises three radars at Fylingdales, UK, Thule, Greenland and Clear, Alaska. The PAVE PAWS network comprises two radars at Beale, California and Cape Cod, Massachusetts. The radar’s operations are conducted automatically, controlled by the system’s software, to detect and track ballistic missiles and satellites of interest. The US now wants to upgrade many of these with new technology to use in the BMD programme. This will involve replacing the computer hardware and software to allow more precise identification and tracking of hostile ballistic missiles.

The US is also upgrading the SPY-1 radars aboard 15 Aegis warships.

A note on Fylingdales: The early-warning radar deployed at the Fylingdales Royal Air Force base, North Yorkshire, is designed to detect and track ballistic missiles launched against the USA, Canada and Europe. It is known as a phased array radar and began operating in 1953. The Fylingdales radar is part of the BMEWS radar network that became operational in the early 1960s. Considerably updated since then, it has operated in its present form since 1992.

New Radars: In addition to upgrading the existing radars, the BMD programme will also require the construction of completely new X-Band radar facilities, probably at existing radar sites such as Fylingdales. An X-Band radar (so called because it operates in the X-ray band of the electromagnetic spectrum) would provide the US with the crucial discrimination capabilities to distinguish incoming warheads from decoys and debris that the current radars cannot provide.

The US is building new ground-based X-Band Radars (XBR), and is developing sea-based X-Band radars (SBX), both to be deployed by 2005 (included in Aegis BMD costs).

Ground Relay Stations: Two other facilities, one in England and one in Australia, are also central to the functioning of the global BMD system. These are the Menwith Hill Ground Relay Station, UK, and the Pine Gap Joint Space Research Facility, Australia. The function of these facilities, with regard to BMD, is to receive information from early-warning and missile-tracking satellites and relay that information to command and control centres in the US. The facility at Menwith Hill allows early-warning information detected by satellites covering the northern hemisphere to be relayed to the USA, similarly the installation at Pine Gap covers the southern hemisphere. Both installations have been used for many years to relay early-warning information to the US and this is unlikely to stop, regardless of whether some of that information is used for a missile defence system.

NATO is currently engaged in a feasibility study for a BMD system to protect forces in the field. Full-scale development is due to begin in 2005 with deployment in 2010. NATO recently announced that it will also begin a feasibility study of extensive missile defences to protect against long- and short-range ballistic missile threats to protect NATO countries and population centres.

The main argument put forward by proponents of BMD is that there are ‘rogue states’ out there that despise the USA and are the developing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles with which to deliver them. Sooner or later one of these countries may launch an unexpected ballistic missile attack on the USA.

The past decade has indeed seen a steady increase in the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology and ballistic missile technology. Washington increasingly views these developments as a major threat to its security. The countries of particular concern, the so-called ‘rogue states’, are North Korea and Iran (Iraq was in the list until recently) and to a lesser extent Libya and Syria. North Korea and Iran have programmes aimed at developing or acquiring long-range ballistic missiles. North Korea is ahead of the field in this regard, and is an active proliferator of the technology as one of its few means of receiving hard currency. However, in the context of Cold War ballistic missile arsenals, the emerging nuclear missile threat from ‘rogue states’ is small, though a threat nonetheless.

It is argued that the USA must deploy missile defences out of self-defence. It is putting itself at unnecessary risk or subject itself to nuclear blackmail if it does not. It is, therefore, the duty of the President to ensure missile defences are deployed.

It is agreed by many, though by no mean all, missile defence advocates that arms control, diplomacy and international agreements can be useful tools for creating norms against proliferation and arms races and in some cases actively preventing it, but this cannot be guaranteed, especially when dealing with irrational dictators. The US must rely on its military technology to protect itself. September 11^th aptly demonstrated how known threats, if not dealt with, will unexpectedly strike with devastating consequences.

It is also argued that BMD systems will deter not only the use of these weapons against the USA but also their development altogether when ‘rogue states’ see that their ballistic missiles cannot get past the US BMD shield.

As the phrase ‘missile defence’ implies, these are defensive systems, not aggressive offensive capabilities.

The events of September 11^th 2001, although unrelated to missile defence, have had a significant effect. The unexpectedness of the attacks and subsequent heightening general threat perceptions have been used to advance the cause of missile defence by grouping international terrorism and ‘rogue states’ together as a broad, unpredictable, homogenous threat.

This is reasoning put forward for missile defence, and it can be quite seductive. Opponents of missile defence take a different view, but there are also deeper, more powerful currents flowing beneath the surface.

There are several good arguments against missile defence:

1. Proliferation: Building missile defences will make other countries feel less secure. These country’s will either develop nuclear weapons or build-up current nuclear arsenals, undermining the non-proliferation regime still further;
2. Arms racing: by extension one can envisage the beginnings of arms racing between offensive and defensive technologies as one seeks to outdo the other. This could occur between the US and China or the US and Russia;
3. Weaponisation of space: missile defences will lead to the weaponisation of space. This has serious consequences for international security that have not been addressed.

This third point cannot be underestimated. BMD deployment is accepted by the highest levels of US military command as the next step towards the complete domination of space. A symposium in 2000 entitled ‘Space and Missile Defense – Key Enablers of Strategic Dominance’ was co-sponsored by the US Army War College, the US Army Space and Missile Command and the Association of the US Army. The conference brief states that "strategic dominance in space is exactly what the United States should be contemplating and achieving" in what was labelled "the great geostrategic game".

The alarming doctrine of ‘full spectrum dominance of land, sea, air and space’ is clearly spelt out in the US Space Command’s ‘Vision 2020’ document. An array of advanced technologies identified by the 1999 Defense Science Board are being researched and developed to fulfil the perceived need for space domination. They include particle-beam generators, electro-magnetic guns, free-electron lasers, X-ray lasers and chemical lasers.

In March 2003 the US’ first space squadron, the 614th Space Intelligence Squadron who job it is to is to defend communications, weather, navigation and missile-warning satellites from enemy attacks both against ground stations and in space, became operational.

At present thirty or more nations possess significant space industries and eight countries have direct access to space through Space Launch Vehicles (SLVs). If the USA decides to place weapons in space it will have a significant technological and strategic advantage, but the advantage will not remain for long. Other major or regional powers will develop their own space-based systems or asymmetric technology (such as information warfare, anti-satellite weapons and other systems designed to disable enemy weapon-systems rather than compete with those systems) that could target US space-based weapons and the early-warning satellites that provide essential battle information.

For example China recently announced that it has developed and successfully ground-tested a new anti-satellite weapon designed to ‘stick’ to the body of an enemy satellite so as to go unnoticed, then rendering it ineffective through jamming when activated. The anti-satellite weapon called a ‘parasitic satellite’, will be deployed experimentally and tested in space in the near future. China has also stepped up its manned-space flight programme and intends to explore the moon and possibly establish its own space station.

This extension of war-fighting to space has many serious implications. Since the US alone has over 200 commercial, civil and military satellites in active operation with a combined value of over $100 billion, the primary cause for concern would be the economic and conflict-management consequences of the global breakdown of communication systems, both military and commercial. For these reasons, it is often argued it would be in the long-term interests of the major powers to negotiate a treaty to prohibit the weaponisation of space. This could include an agreement on the peaceful uses of space, a treaty to ban the deployment of ground or space-based anti-satellite weapons, and the expansion of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty (which currently prohibits the placing of nuclear weapons in space) to cover directed energy and laser weapons.

This looks unlikely under the current administration. Before Rumsfeld was appointed Secretary of Defense he headed the Congressionally mandated Commission to Assess National Security Space Management and Organisation. The Commission has called for the establishment of an Under-Secretary of Defence for Space, Intelligence and Communication, the development of space weapons and the option to deploy them.

There should be no doubt that the US plans to, and in all probability will, place weapons in space as part of its BMD programme. The consequences of this are unknown but are likely to be very destabilising.

This brings me to underlying current which, not pulling any punches, is the US neo-conservative ideological quest for supremacy.

From this perspective one see’s the missile defence programme as first and foremost part of the US neo-conservative drive to indefinately maintain is dominant geopolitical position in the world. This doctrine asserts that the US can, and should, use its pre-eminent economic and military position to unilaterally establish and enforce a world order that allows America to feel secure because it is able to exercise its commercial, strategic and ideological interests. What is more this is no bad thing because what is good for America is by definition good for the world ergo that which makes America secure makes the world secure.

At the heart of this doctrine lies military supremacy. The US will brook no compromise with a challenger to the US-imposed status quo. Anything that constrains Washington’s ability to operate in this way is rejected and any state (or sub-state group) that challenges the Pax Americana does not, by definition, have the interests of world peace and security at heart and will be legitimately contained, or challenged forcibly removed. When push comes to shove diplomacy, cooperative security regimes and arms control are incapable of providing security and cannot, and must not, be relied on to prevent proliferation or deal with international crises.

The US perceives itself, in this role, as the world’s first benign imperial power, but other major powers do not share this view. Rather they see want to see a ‘multi-polar’ world with centres of military, economic or political power in Russia, Europe, India, China and Japan as well as America. Further US efforts to establish greater superiority will undoubtedly be seen as a threat to other major powers’ regional interests and cause hostile reactions.

Many see the ‘end game’ of this ideaology as containing, and even undermining, China. Indeed in 1999 Senator Jon Kyl (R-Ariz) stated that "National Missile Defense must be able to defeat and deter the Chinese threat".

Many argue that missile defence systems are too complex and will not work effectively. However, the Pentagon has made significant progress on these technologies over the past 5years and will undoubtedly continue to do so. One can argue that a broad missile defence system will not work as well as the Pentagon claims it will, and it certainly won’t provide an impenetrable shield, but functioning missile defence systems will be certainly be deployed, even if some of the programmes fail tests and are hidden from Congressional oversight.

As for the cost, well its outrageous, maybe up to $600 - $800 billion over the next 30 or so years, but the US can afford it. It s annual defence budget is now $400 billion and will rise to $500 billion in the next few years. This is about 13-14% of the Governments’ budget and about 3.3-3.4% of GDP.

The Missile Technology Control Regime was established in 1987. It restricts the export of missile delivery systems and related technology for those systems capable of carrying a 500km payload at least 300km, as well as systems intended for the delivery of WMD. The MTCR is a voluntary arrangement among 27 countries consisting of common export policies applied to a common list of controlled items.

The MTCR was originally concerned only with nuclear capable delivery systems. In January 1993 this was extended to cover delivery systems capable of delivering all WMDThe MTCR was originally established as means of slowing down the proliferation of ballistic missile technology through export controls by those states with access to ballistic missile technology. However, this technology is now available in many countries outside the regime. If this proliferation is to be prevented, a more comprehensive global regime is needed. Ideally this would envisage initiatives to:

• Restrict the development of all missiles and missile defenses.
• Ban the flight-testing of all missiles together with intrusive verification measures.
• Develop of missile–free zones.
• Establish an international transparency regime on missile programmes with an international data exchange centre.
• Establish a pre-launch notification agreement.
• Develop confidence-building measures (CBMs) and verification measures to distinguish between legitimate space-vehicle programmes and potentially destabilising ballistic missile programmes.

A new arrangement to prevent the spread of ballistic missiles was launched in November 2002 when 93 countries, including the United States, signed the International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (ICOC). It is the most wide-ranging international agreement on missile proliferation signed to date. The purpose of the code is "to prevent and curb the proliferation of Ballistic Missile systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction".

It does not prohibit ballistic missiles but calls on subscribing states "to exercise maximum possible restraint in the development, testing and deployment of Ballistic Missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction, including, where possible, to reduce national holdings of such missiles." Under the code, states agree not to assist ballistic missile programs in countries suspected of developing nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons. The ICOC also calls for subscribing states to "exercise the necessary vigilance" in assisting other countries’ space-launch programmes, because countries could use space programs to disguise ballistic missile programmes.

Although subscribing countries have agreed to adhere to the agreement, the code is not a treaty, it is not legally binding, and it contains no formal consequences for non-compliance. Although the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) seeks to restrict proliferation of missiles, it only does so through export controls and has only 33 members. The code has a much larger membership and, unlike the MTCR, calls on subscribing states to show restraint in their own missile programs.

The biggest problem diplomacy and the rule of law faces is that there are no mechanisms in the these agreements, and treaties like the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, with which to enforce compliance if a country is found to be cheating. The neo-conservatives often cite this problem as a reason for their unilateralist, military approach.